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INTRODUCTION
Despite controversy about its role in awarding damages in cases
involving punitive damages and medical malpractice, the American
civil jury remains a common institution for resolving tort claims and
other types of disputes in all fifty states and in federal courts.  Not1
surprisingly, a substantial empirical literature consisting of archival
studies, jury simulation experiments, and, in one important instance,
records of the actual deliberations of Arizona civil juries, has
attempted to learn about how civil juries perform the tasks assigned
to them. In this Article, we address a relatively understudied aspect
of personal injury awards by civil juries, namely compensatory
awards. Specifically, we explore the relationship between so-called
“noneconomic” components of compensatory awards and their
economic components, a subject that Marshall Shapo among others
has discussed as one of the most controversial subjects in tort law.2
Although previous research, partially summarized infra, has
explored the relationships between economic and noneconomic
components of jury awards, it has been limited in both scope and
empirical evidence.  Further exploration of this relationship seems3
appropriate to the theme of the present conference which seeks to
place the American civil jury in its political context.4
1. The right to a jury trial in common law areas such as tort is guaranteed in federal
courts by the Seventh Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. While the Seventh Amendment
has not to date been applied to the states, “the great majority of state constitutions” provide
similar guarantees. Eric J. Hamilton, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 851, 852 (2013).
2. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 80-84 (2012).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See generally Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J.
1331 (2012).
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I. PRIOR RESEARCH AND OUR FOCUS ON “NONECONOMIC” DAMAGES
A. The Challenge of Noneconomic Damages
Tort law provides monetary compensation for losses in personal
injury cases that include not only concrete, tangible losses such as
medical bills, property loss, and past and future lost income, but
also for losses that are clearly tangible but ineffable in monetary
terms. These include pain and suffering, loss of society, emotional
distress, loss of consortium, disfigurement, loss of child-bearing
capacity, loss of parental guidance, and loss of enjoyment of life,
as well as other categories of loss. Along with the issue of punitive
damages,  these latter components of damage awards, often5
summarized as “noneconomic” awards, or simply—and incor-
rectly—labeled as “pain and suffering,” are among the most
contentious issues related to the American civil jury. They play a
significant role in attempts to limit awards in medical malpractice
cases,  are a central target of so-called “tort reform” efforts,  and are6 7
often based on fallacious claims and distortions.  Not surprisingly,8
they are the subject of frequent legal commentary about the goals
of tort law.9
5. The issue of punitive damages, which is not the focus of this Article, has been the
subject of a substantial doctrinal debate and commentary, Supreme Court and state court
decisions, and a sizeable empirical literature. See, e.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman, Symposium,
Punitive Damages, Due Process, and Deterrence: The Debate After Philip Morris v. Williams,
2 CHARLESTON L. REV. i (2008).
6. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar & Kara MacKillop, “Judicial Hellholes:” Medical Malpractice
Claims, Verdicts and the “Doctor Exodus” in Illinois, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1309 (2006); Neil
Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the Contingency Fee
System, Juries and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217 (2005). 
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: REFORM
POLITICS, MASS MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 96 (2004); LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN ET AL.,
PAC. RESEARCH INST., JACKPOT JUSTICE: THE TRUE COST OF AMERICA’S TORT SYSTEM (2007),
available at http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/2007PDFS/PRI_2007JackpotJus
ticeFinal.pdf.
8. See Tom Baker et al., Jackpot Justice and the American Tort System: Thinking Beyond
Junk Science (July 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152306.
9. See, e.g., SHAPO, supra note 2, at 80-84; Joseph King, Jr., Pain and Suffering,
Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163 (2004).
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A sizeable body of empirical literature bearing on jury damage
awards utilizes various research approaches, including systematic
interviews with jurors following their verdicts,  analyses of actual10
jury deliberations,  simulation experiments with varying factors11
that might influence the verdict process,  and archival studies that12
draw upon verdict reports to compare the components of actual jury
awards across an array of cases.13
In this Article, we utilize archival data from multiple sources to
attempt to shed more light on the noneconomic components of civil
jury awards in personal injury cases. Pursuing this topic by
systematically utilizing archival data is important for two reasons.
The first reason lies in the nature of noneconomic damages. As
many commentators have pointed out, by their very nature
noneconomic damages are conceptually a contradiction in terms:
they provide monetary compensation for an injury that is intangible
in monetary terms.  A common claim is that juries do not have the14
competence to assess these damages because jurors are too often
swayed by emotions and in particular do not have the perspective
of comparable cases, thus, injecting randomness and unfairness into
the tort system.15
10. See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2000); NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND OUTRAGEOUS
DAMAGE AWARDS 240 (1995).
11. See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 267-79 (2007);
Neil Vidmar, Civil Juries in Ecological Context: Methodological Implications for Research, in
CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 35 (Brian H.
Bornstein et al. eds., 2008).
12. See CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 11, at 23-195, for a review of much of this literature plus other approaches to
understanding damage awards. 
13. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF
REFORM (1995); Barry L. Anderson et al., Report on Awards for Noneconomic Loss, in FLA.
MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE POLICY GUIDEBOOK 132, 132-48 (Henry G. Manne ed.,
1985); MARK A. PETERSON, RAND CORP., COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS
IN COOK COUNTY (1984), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
reports/2007/R3011.pdf; W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1991); Randall R.
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering Awards, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-
Verdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1998).
14. See, e.g., VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 11, at 295-98.
15. For summaries of the various critiques of the civil jury, see DANIELS & MARTIN, supra
note 13, at 4-26; Peter H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: ASSESSING
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B. The Challenge of Assessing the Appropriate Level of                 
Noneconomic Damages
Critics claim that the noneconomic portion of awards is often
much greater than the actual economic loss, suggesting that emo-
tion rather than reason influences juries.  Yet, consider the16
following case of Lillian Walters, a thirty-two-year-old stay-at-home
mother of four minor children.17
In December 1979, Mrs. Walters’s family physician discovered
a lump on her neck, and after conducting some tests referred her to
a surgeon.  The surgeon advised that Mrs. Walters have a portion18
of her thyroid gland removed due to its diseased condition.  The19
suggested surgery was relatively low risk and normally would result
in a small scar.  A day after the surgery, while Mrs. Walters was20
still in the hospital, her condition deteriorated. Her head ballooned
in size, she became blind, and she suffered severe respiratory
distress.  Shortly after she was moved into intensive care, the21
pathology department advised the surgeon that a piece of esophagus
tissue was attached to the thyroid specimen.  It was determined22
that the area of the surgery was now badly infected,  and Mrs.23
Walters was taken back to surgery where the surgeon reopened the
wound, discovered a significant hole in the esophagus, determined
that repair was not possible, and sewed the esophagus closed.24
Initially Mrs. Walters could only be fed by a tube inserted into her
stomach through the abdomen; she did regain her vision, and after
numerous hospitalizations and surgeries, Mrs. Walters was left with
THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 306, 306-19 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). On the specific point of the
lack of perspective of comparable cases, see Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain
and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (1995).
16. See PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF
TORT LAW 136 (1997) (“[J]uries are often overcome with sympathy when faced with someone
who has been hurt.”).
17. Walters v. Hitchcock, 697 P.2d 847, 848 (Kan. 1985).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 849.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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a replacement esophagus fashioned from a portion of colon.25
Although she was then able to consume food via her mouth, the
replacement esophagus did not function like an actual esophagus.
Mrs. Walters had great difficulty both swallowing and keeping food
in her stomach.  Eating was painful, and she could not lie flat26
because food would come back up through the replacement esopha-
gus.  Her condition was embarrassing and distasteful to people27
around her and made living a normal life impossible.  Her life28
expectancy was more than forty years, but no further medical
treatment would improve her situation.  Because she did not work29
outside the home,  economic damages consisted entirely of past30
medical expenses, and those expenses totaled approximately
$59,000.  What would be an appropriate amount for noneconomic31
damages in this case? Walters’s lawyer asked for $4 million in total
damages,  and the jury in the case awarded $2 million,  which32 33
meant that the noneconomic damages were about thirty-three times
the economic damages. Was this excessive in this case, where the
plaintiff experienced a severe, life-changing event with tangible
consequences that she had to endure for the rest of her life? Was the
compensation award unreasonable?34
The Walters case partly reveals some of the conceptual problems
that exist in thinking about noneconomic damages. Although often
labeled by critics as merely pain and suffering, should her injury be
25. Id.
26. Id. at 852.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 848.
31. Id. at 857.
32. Id. at 847, 849.
33. Id. at 848.
34. Critics could raise various issues about this case. For example, given that the award
was for a lifetime of suffering, should it in some way be reduced to present value, and if so,
what discount rate should be used? At the time of the state supreme court decision that
upheld the award against dissent, the interest rate was about 10 percent. Prime Interest Rate
History, FEDPRIMERATE.COM, http://www.fedprimerate.com/wall_street_journal_
prime_rate_history.htm#current (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). At the time this Article was
written, the interest rate on a five-year certificate of deposit was around 1 percent. CD Rates:
National High Yield, BANKRATE, http://www.bankrate.com/funnel/cd-investments/cd-invest
ment-results.aspx?prods=19 (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).  The interest rate on a simple savings
account is a whopping 0.03%—that is, three hundredths of one percent.
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labeled so simply? In fact, many state legislatures have defined
additional elements of damages for which there is no clear dollar
value, but the jury or judge translates the injury consequences into
monetary terms. A sample of medical malpractice verdicts from the
Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter helps to illustrate these issues.
Araujo v. Leong involved an injury during birth causing hypoxic
encephalopathy to deep structures in the brain and resulting in
severe cerebral palsy and quadriplegia.  The jury award was35
$17,070,000, which consisted of $3 million in past and future
medical expenses, $10 million for caretaking expenses, $570,000 for
other economic losses, $1 million for loss of a normal life, $2 million
for pain and suffering, and $500,000 for disfigurement.  Thus in36
this case the noneconomic component of the award amounted to
8.8% of the total.
Estate of Petre v. Kucich involved a patient who suffered a
serious staph infection.  The jury award was $814,444, which37
consisted of $350,000 for loss of a normal life, $200,000 for pain and
suffering, $50,000 for disfigurement, $175,000 for emotional
distress, and $39,444 for medical expenses.  Thus in this case the38
noneconomic component amounted to approximately 95% of the
total.
Estate of Pettway v. Advocate Trinity Hospital involved a two-
year-old male child who suffered a seizure and was rushed to the
nearest hospital.  A decision was made to transfer him to the39
University of Chicago Hospital, but first a CT scan was needed to
rule out bleeding in the brain.  However, there were no records of40
monitoring the child or recording his vital signs. The child died; he
was survived by his parents and five siblings. The breakdown of the
$3,662,221 verdict was as follows: $7813 for medical expenses,
$4408 for funeral expenses, and $3,650,000 for loss of society.  The41
35. West’s Jury Verdicts—Illinois Reports: Jury Tells Hospital to Pay $17M for Minor’s
Brain Damage, 2005 WL 4135362 (Ill. Cir. Ct.).
36. Araujo v. Leong, No. 02L-4474, Cook Cnty. Jury Verdict Rptr. (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 31,
2002).
37. No. 02L-14506, Cook Cnty. Jury Verdict Rptr. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 6, 2005).
38. Id.
39. No. 07L-8318, Cook Cnty. Jury Verdict Rptr. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 26, 2010). 
40. Id.
41. Id.
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breakdown of the loss of society component was as follows:
$1,500,000 each for the mother and father, $250,000 for one sibling,
and $100,000 each for four other siblings.42
In Hopper v. Lopez, a fifty-seven-year-old male suffered a seizure
and was taken to an emergency room.  Doctors ordered an MRI to43
rule out infection as the cause of the seizure.  The radiologist who44
interpreted the MRI failed to report severe sinusitis and an
extension of the infection into the left side of the brain.  Ten45
neurologists and an internist relied upon the radiologist’s report.46
The hospital released Mr. Hopper.  Two weeks later, however, he47
had a new set of seizures because the infection had expanded
throughout the entire left side of his brain, and five surgeries were
required to stabilize him.  Mr. Hopper suffered severe, permanent48
cognitive deficits, which affected every part of his life.  The49
$2,626,000 verdict was composed of $626,000 for past and future
medical expenses, $1 million for past and future loss of a normal
life, $250,000 for past pain and suffering, and $750,000 to his wife
for loss of consortium.50
Rodriguez v. Friedman resulted in a $3,270,000 verdict for a
brachial plexus birth injury.  The child had a shorter, smaller right51
arm and motion deficits. He underwent three surgeries and several
years of physical therapy, and he was recommended for a future
surgery.  The jury awarded $225,000 for past and future medical52
expenses, $200,000 for educational expenses, $50,000 for loss of
wages, $1,677,000 for past and future disability, $363,350 for
disfigurement, and $754,650 for past and future pain and
suffering.53
42. Id.
43. Hopper v. Lopez, No. 05L-10747, Cook Cnty. Jury Verdict Rptr. (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 20,
2010).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. No. 05L-14640, Cook Cnty. Jury Verdict Rptr. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2010).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The Walters case and the selected other examples draw attention
to two important issues. First, the noneconomic aspects of plaintiffs’
injuries should not be lumped into a single category called “pain and
suffering.” Illinois and other state legislatures have delineated a
number of categories of damages that, like pain and suffering,
cannot be translated directly into a monetary sum.  Rather,54
compensation for these other categories of injury requires human
judgment to convert the injury into a monetary sum, typically
determined by a jury, although sometimes by a judge or arbitration
board.55
Second, despite serious or even grievous injury, the plaintiff may
have no economic losses or very small economic losses in comparison
to noneconomic losses, as the Walters and Araujo cases above help
to illustrate.  And, of course, the important substantive and56
methodological consequence of this observation is that using
economic loss as the denominator for assessing noneconomic losses
can be very misleading because economic loss does not always
capture the severity of the injury in terms of the noneconomic
consequences of that injury. Still, one would expect that in the
aggregate there would be a relationship between economic and
noneconomic injuries and the consequent total amount of the
damage award. The core question we examine next is the nature of
the relationship between economic damages and noneconomic
compensatory damages as determined by juries.
C. Extant Empirical Research on Noneconomic Damages
The second reason for our focus is that the empirical literature
bearing on what juries actually do in regard to these noneconomic
claims is surprisingly sparse.
54. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 58/10 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483(3)
(2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43(H)(3) (West 2013).
55. Although English common law developed the concept of juries deciding noneconomic
damages, such damages in England today are decided by guideline formulas determined by
a Judicial Studies Board and are assessed on a case-by-case basis by judicially trained people.
See JUDICIAL STUDIES BD., GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL DAMAGES IN
PERSONAL INJURY CASES ix (Burnett et al. eds., 11th ed. 2012).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 18-36.
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Jeffrey O’Connell and Rita Simon looked at payments for pain
and suffering using a sample of claims that a single insurance
company paid to Illinois residents in 1966.  They limited their57
study to claims involving a payment of at least $100, including
property loss, economic damages, and noneconomic damages.  Their58
data were derived from a combination of insurance records and
interviews with 391 claimants.  The authors computed the ratio of59
payment to loss—the “recovery ratio”—for cases that were litigated
(only 17 such cases were in the sample), unlitigated cases in which
an attorney represented the claimant (77 cases), and cases with no
representation (297 cases);  the respective recovery ratios for the60
three groups were 5.3:1, 2.1:1, and 1.5:1.61
In an early study of jury verdicts, Mark Peterson examined
almost 9000 cases from the 1960s and 1970s compiled in the Cook
County Jury Verdict Reporter.  Among his findings, verdicts62
involving high medical expenses and lost income were approxi-
mately 4.5 times larger than verdicts for plaintiffs having lesser
injuries.  Plaintiffs with medical malpractice, product liability, and63
work injury claims obtained two to four times more than plaintiffs
with other types of personal injury claims.  However, Peterson was64
only able to look at total compensatory damages because the data he
employed did not separate out various types of compensatory
damages.65
Ostrom and his coauthors examined data from the National
Center for State Courts’s study of forty-five urban trial courts
during 1992.  Those researchers found a large discrepancy between66
the mean and median awards—with the mean being greater than
the median —indicating that very large awards had skewed the67
57. JEFFREY O’CONNELL & RITA JAMES SIMON, PAYMENT FOR PAIN & SUFFERING 14 (1972).
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 14-16.
60. Id. at 15-16.
61. Id. at 16.
62. PETERSON, supra note 13.
63. Id. at 28.
64. Id. at 36.
65. Id. at vi.
66. Brian Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s,
79 JUDICATURE 233, 233 n.1 (1996). 
67. Id. at 238.
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distribution. Medical malpractice cases tended to have much higher
awards, on average, than other types of cases.  Again, the research-68
ers did not separate economic and noneconomic components of the
damages.
Danzon’s and Lillard’s study of a sample of medical malpractice
cases from liability insurers’ files closed in 1974 and 1976 found
that approximately 7% of claims went to trial and plaintiffs
prevailed 28% of the time.  Comparing the awards with estimates69
of economic losses, injury severity, and the plaintiff ’s age, Danzon
and Lillard found that total jury awards for compensatory damages
were related to the magnitude of the plaintiff ’s losses.  Those70
authors assumed that the difference between the insurers’ measure
of economic loss and the jury award constituted the jury’s award for
noneconomic damages.71
Bovbjerg and his coauthors analyzed a sample of 898 personal
injury cases that went to a jury.  The median award in 1987 was72
$82,000, but the mean award was $490,000.  Those authors also73
assumed that the difference between economic loss and total award
constituted the compensation for noneconomic damages.  Their74
study also coded the seriousness of the injury according to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s (NAIC) nine-
point scale of injury severity.  Awards increased with the severity75
of injury, except when the outcome was death in which case the
award was typically lower.  Severity of physical injury accounted76
for about two-fifths of the variation and other factors accounted for
one-fifth.  The authors speculated that jury unreliability may77
explain most of the remaining variability.78
68. See id.
69. Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 347, 354-55 (1983).
70. See id. at 346-47.
71. Id. at 358.
72. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 13, at 919-24, 936-37.
73. Id. at 922.
74. Id. at 913 n.31.
75. See id. at 921 for the specifics of the NAIC scale, which ranges from 1 (emotional only)
to 9 (death).
76. Id. at 921-23.
77. Id. at 923.
78. Id. at 924 n.85.
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Daniels and Martin compared medical malpractice and product
liability awards in a large sample of cases reported in verdict
reporters from venues around the United States.  They also found79
that awards were related to severity of injury.  They did not look80
explicitly at the awards for noneconomic damages because virtually
none of the verdict reporters that constituted their sources reported
that information.81
Viscusi compared payments in a sample of product liability
cases, most of which were settled rather than tried.  He concluded82
that payments were related to severity of injury.  However, for83
several reasons, Viscusi’s analysis tells us little about jury behavior. 
First, he did not separate out results for cases in which juries
awarded damages to the plaintiff (only 1.5% of the filed claims in his
dataset—roughly 150 cases—resulted in a court verdict for the
plaintiff).  Second, it appears that his analysis focused on pay-84
ments, which means that even for the cases where there was a
plaintiff ’s verdict, the actual payment may have reflected a remitti-
tur or a post-verdict settlement rather than the amount set by the
jury.  Finally, Viscusi had to assume that the payment for pain and85
suffering was the difference between the amount paid and the
insurer’s estimate of financial loss.86
Taragin and his coauthors analyzed a sample of cases taken
from the New Jersey Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange.  Those87
investigators were mostly interested in estimates of defendant
79. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 92-198. 
80. Id. at 127, 175.
81. Only one reporter that Daniels and Martin used had specific information on both
economic and noneconomic damages. The data from that reporter indicated that the award
for noneconomic damages was, on average, slightly more than the award for economic
damages. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement
Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship,
23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 795, 817 n.23 (1998).
82. W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic
Compensation or Capricious Awards?, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (1988).
83. Id. at 217.
84. Id. at 205. Presumably the vast majority of these roughly 150 cases involved jury
awards.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 780 (1992). 
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responsibility,  but they did find a relationship between rating of88
injury severity and amount of total payment.  However, their89
research did report separate elements of the payment data.90
Sloan and his coauthors found that in a sample of medical
malpractice cases levels of injury and economic losses varied
substantially from patient to patient, even among those with
roughly comparable injuries.  While such variability should91
surprise no one who thinks about such factors as age and economic
differences between plaintiffs, this explanation frequently has been
ignored.
Finley examined a sample of California medical malpractice jury
verdicts and the potential effects of California’s MICRA cap on pain
and suffering on plaintiffs who were children, women, elderly
persons, and members of minority groups.  Finley argued that92
these were plaintiffs most likely to have relatively low economic
losses but major claims for noneconomic damages.  Her conclusion93
was that caps unfairly disadvantaged these types of plaintiffs.94
Vidmar, Gross, and Rose obtained a sample of jury verdicts in
medical malpractice cases from jurisdictions within three different
states: New York, Florida, and California.  Those authors classified95
the cases according to injury seriousness. Consistent with previous
research, the total awards were positively related to the seriousness
of the physical injury suffered by the plaintiff but tended to drop in
cases involving death of the patient.  However, similar to previous96
studies, those authors found that verdict reporters seldom listed the
specific elements of the general damage award, instead often
lumped all noneconomic awards as pain and suffering.  Neverthe-97
less, there were exceptions, namely reporting awards for such losses
88. Id. at 780-81.
89. Id. at 781-83.
90. Id. at 781.
91. Frank A. Sloan & Stephen van Wert, Cost of Injuries, in SUING FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 123, 139-40 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993).
92. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children and the
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1282-84 (2004).
93. Id. at 1313.
94. Id.
95. Vidmar et al., supra note 13, at 266.
96. Id. at 284-86.
97. Id. at 270, 296.
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as loss of companionship, loss of consortium, emotional distress,
disfigurement, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and human
damages.98
One of the few studies that looked specifically at noneconomic
awards was Vidmar and MacKillop’s study of a sample of medical
malpractice cases from Cook and DuPage counties, in Illinois, as
well as two downstate counties covering the years 2001 through
2004.  Their article addressed the potential effect of a cap on pain99
and suffering during that time period.  The findings clearly100
contradicted the claims that pain and suffering constituted 90% of
all malpractice verdicts.  For the year of 2001, there were thirty101
medical malpractice awards in Cook and DuPage counties.  While102
eight cases involved pain and suffering awards that equaled or
exceeded $1 million,  in at least five other cases there was no pain103
and suffering award.  And the pain and suffering component104
exceeded the economic losses in only four cases.  One calculation105
suggested that, on average, pain and suffering constituted only 15%
of the award.106
This summary of the extant empirical literature on compensa-
tory damage awards indicates that empirical evidence is sparse,
especially when it comes to the noneconomic components of those
awards. As Vidmar observed, data in verdict reports often have
substantial weaknesses.  Much of the difficulty lies in the absence107
of data, especially information on the precise nature of the injury
98. Id. at 296.
99. Vidmar & MacKillop, supra note 6, at 1320-32.
100. Id. at 1313.
101. Id. at 1332-35.
102. Id. at 1333.
103. Id. at 1333-34.
104. Id.
105. Id. In several cases, however, there were awards for disfigurement or other
components that Illinois statutes defined as economic losses. See id. at 1334.
106. Using a set of data on jury verdicts in Wisconsin in the mid-1980s, Kritzer notes that
the “best estimate of the ratio [of noneconomic damages to economic damages] for [that]
dataset was about 1.” See Kritzer, supra note 81, at 817 n.23.
107. See generally Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can
Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1233 (1994)
(“[M]any of the conclusions drawn from [jury verdict] studies have no scientific validity. The
methodological limitations of the databases and errors in conceptualizing the issues do not
allow such conclusions.”).
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and breakdowns of awards into economic and noneconomic compo-
nents.  Moreover, even when the data sources do separate108
economic from noneconomic components, they rarely delineate the
particular elements of noneconomic awards.  Nevertheless, with109
appropriate qualifications, archival data can provide an important
starting point to our understanding of what juries actually do.
In this Article, as described immediately below, we draw upon
various sources to estimate the relative percentages of jury damage
awards across time and across case types. Our goal is to increase
discussion about what civil juries do in awarding damages. Hope-
fully, the findings will provoke discussion about the causes of these
outcomes and their fairness—or lack of it—and lead to insights
about the role of civil juries in the American democratic process.
II. DATA SOURCES AND ANALYTIC APPROACH
A. Data
As noted in the Introduction, scholars have conducted fairly
extensive analyses of punitive damage awards.  This has been110
facilitated by the fact that when there is a request for punitive
damages, the jury is asked to decide whether such damages should
be awarded and, if so, the specific award.  As suggested by our111
brief review in the previous section, the challenge in looking at
noneconomic damage awards is that in many courts juries are asked
to return a general verdict in which only a single figure is given
covering all compensatory damages.  Specific figures for categories112
of compensatory damages exist only when a jury has been presented
with a special verdict form with those categories specified.  There113
are three notable situations in which a special verdict is used. The
first is if there is a cap on one or more categories of compensatory
108. See id. at 1229.
109. See id. at 1228-29.
110. See supra note 5.
111. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 788 (2013).
112. See Vidmar, supra note 107, at 1229.
113. Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on
Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 743, 759-61 (2000).
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damages, such as in medical malpractice cases in some states.114
Normally, juries are not explicitly told of such caps, and the judge
will reduce any amount above the cap to no more than the cap.115
The second situation arises when there is a local practice of using a
special verdict form for damages in personal injury cases.  The116
final situation occurs when one side in a case specifically asks that
a special verdict form be used—perhaps when the defense is
concerned that an award will be excessive—and believes that having
a breakdown into categories will facilitate a request for a
remittitur.117
We identified three sources of data compiled directly from jury
verdicts which contain useful information on both economic and
noneconomic damages.  The first source is a set of original data118
compiled by the authors using the Cook County Jury Verdict
Reporter. We obtained copies of verdict reports for auto accident,
medical and dental malpractice, and premises liability cases for the
years 2005 and 2010.  From these reports we coded the amounts119
for each detailed category of damages listed in the report. We also
coded the gender of the plaintiff, the age of the plaintiff, and the
severity of the claimed injury using the NAIC injury scale.  Coding120
was conducted by a staff assistant and checked by one of the
authors. In cases where multiple plaintiffs suffered personal
injuries, we treated each plaintiff as a separate case for purposes of
114. 1 FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 8.9 (2013).
115. Greene & Bornstein, supra note 113, at 762.
116. 1 FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 8.9.
117. Id.
118. Note that for the BJS data and the other four sets of data that we use, we have no way
of knowing whether the presence of a nonzero value for either economic or noneconomic
damages, but not both, is indicative of all of the damages being allocated by a jury to a single
category or of an incomplete record. Hence, we did not include in our analysis cases with a
nonzero value for only one category of compensatory damages, but not both. 
119. The Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter has several other categories of personal injury
cases that we have not included. Those categories include FELA/work injuries, common
carriers, street hazards, assault/dram shop, animal injury, and product liability. Note that
across the two years only six product liability cases involved personal injuries; most of the
omitted cases were specialized categories of road/traffic accidents.
120. If the plaintiff claimed multiple injuries, we coded the most severe.
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analysis, which gave us a total of 262 observations.  The amounts121
from the 2005 verdicts were adjusted to 2010 dollars.
Not all of the case reports had full breakdowns of damages; for
some of those cases we inferred the breakdown between economic
and noneconomic damages in one of two ways. For cases that
showed specific breakdowns for categories of economic damages or
categories of noneconomic damages, but not for both, and for which
the total of the breakdown reported was less than the overall
verdict, we assumed that the difference between the total and the
verdict was the other type of damages. For example, if the total
verdict was $20,000 and the report showed that $8000 was for past
medical expenses, and $3000 was for lost income, we assumed that
$9000 was for noneconomic damages. For cases that provided no
breakdown at all but presented the amounts the plaintiff claimed
for medical expenses and/or lost income, and the sum of those
amounts was less than the verdict, we assumed that the difference
between the verdict and the claimed economic damages was the
noneconomic damages component. Thus, if the report showed the
verdict as $20,000 and the plaintiff claimed $8500 in economic
damages, we assumed that the remaining $11,500 awarded was for
noneconomic damages. This provided us with 205 cases for analysis.
Finally, we relied on the gross jury awards before any adjustments
for comparative negligence.
The second source is data on civil jury and bench trials collected
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the National Center
for State Courts (NCSC) as a part of the Civil Justice Survey of
State Courts (CJSSC) involving a sample of counties around the
United States for the fiscal year 2005.  BJS and NCSC collected122
data from samples of the seventy-five largest counties in 1992, 1996,
2001, and 2005;  in 2005, BJS and NCSC extended the study to123
121. For the very small number of derivative claims (e.g., loss of consortium), we combined
the award with the amounts awarded for the primary claim. We had 177 observations from
auto accidents, 66 from medical and dental malpractice, and 19 from premises liability.
122. THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN
STATE COURTS, 2005 (2009), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tbjtsc05.pdf;
LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY
TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 (2008), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc
05.pdf; Thomas H. Cohen, General Civil Jury Trial Litigation in State and Federal Courts: A
Statistical Portrait, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 593 (2008).
123. LANGTON & COHEN, supra note 122, at 1, 15-17.
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include a sample of nonurban counties.  Only the 2005 dataset124
includes information on both economic and noneconomic damages,
and hence, we employ only that dataset in our analysis (henceforth
“BJS dataset”).
The third source is from the RAND Institute of Civil Justice jury
studies project.  RAND collected data from local jury verdict125
reporters in a series of waves.  RAND archived the earlier sets of126
data covering the period 1960-1984 with the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research.  Unfortunately,127
those data do not include separate information on economic and
noneconomic damages. In a later collection, covering the period
1995-1999, RAND did ask its coders to capture separate information
on economic and noneconomic damages when that information was
available.  The data come from selected counties in six states:128
California (forty-six counties), Illinois (Cook County only), Texas
124. See id. at 1. For reports of the 1992, 1996, and 2001 studies, see THOMAS H. COHEN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE
COUNTIES, 2001 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmtvlc01.pdf; THOMAS
H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES,
2001 (2004), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlc01.pdf; MARIKA F. X. LITRAS
ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996
(2000), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlc96.pdf; STEPHEN K. SMITH ET AL.,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/TCILC.PDF.
125. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL, RAND CORP., JURY AWARDS AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
IN TORT CASES (1983), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2009/
N1994.pdf; AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND CORP., DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY
POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3249.pdf; ERIK K. MOLLER, RAND
CORP., EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PERSONAL INJURY JURY AWARDS (1997), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2006/RGSD134.pdf; ERIK K.
MOLLER, RAND CORP., TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985 (1996) [hereinafter
MOLLER, TRENDS], available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_
reports/2007/MR694.pdf; MARK A. PETERSON, RAND CORP., CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980S:
TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (1983),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3466.pdf; PETERSON,
supra note 13; MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND CORP., COMPARATIVE
JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980 (1983),
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/report2006/R3006.pdf; Seth Seabury
et al., Forty Years of Civil Jury Verdicts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004).
126. See e.g., SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 125, at viii.
127. Jury Verdicts Database for Cook County, Illinois, and All Counties in California 1960-
1984 (ICPSR 6232), INTER-UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6232?q=6232 (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
128. See, e.g., MOLLER, TRENDS, supra note 125, at 64.
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(Harris County only), Missouri (St. Louis City and County, Jefferson
County, and St. Charles County), New York (fifty-three counties),
and Washington (King County only).  RAND has not archived the129
later dataset, and that information has been largely unanalyzed.130
However, RAND generously provided us access to this dataset.
Included are 2301 personal injury cases from selected counties in six
different states resulting in plaintiff ’s verdicts that include
information on both economic and noneconomic damages.131
In addition to the three sources compiled directly from reports
of jury verdicts, we have also identified three other sets of data
derived from insurance company files dealing with tried cases that
provide some information on noneconomic damages. Because each
of these datasets has a major limitation, however, we view our
analyses of these latter sources as supplemental and thus, only
report the results in the Appendix, accompanied by our analyses.
B. Analytic Approach
We modeled the core analysis that follows after the recent
analyses of the relationship between punitive and compensatory
damages reported by Eisenberg and his colleagues.132
 Specifically, consistent with Eisenberg, we looked at the
relationship between economic and noneconomic damages graphi-
cally by fitting a simple linear regression line. In order to deal with
129. See e.g., Seabury et al., supra note 125, at 5.
130. We identified one exception: a report that examined the impact of the cap on
noneconomic damages in California medical malpractice cases. See NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL.,
RAND CORP., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA
JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA (2004), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG234.pdf.
131. To avoid investing excessive funds in coding auto accident cases, RAND took a 25%
sample of those cases in most counties. To adjust for this sampling design, we included in our
analysis weights provided with the RAND data in our analysis.
132. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Difference in Punitive Damages
Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court? 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2011); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263
(2006), [hereinafter, Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages]; Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages: Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co.
v. Baker, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5 (2010) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al.,
Variability in Punitive Damages].
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the extreme ranges involved and the relative infrequency of very
large amounts, we transformed the amounts of damages to loga-
rithms.  We also looked at the ratio of noneconomic to economic133
damages conditional on the amount of economic damages; many of
our tables are modeled after Table 1, which appeared in one of
Eisenberg’s recent articles  and which uses data from BJS and134
NCSC studies for 1992, 1996, and 2001.135
III. RESULTS
A. Cook County Data
One feature of the Cook County data is that most reports provide
detailed breakdowns of the damage awards, both for economic
damages and noneconomic damages. Table 2 shows the breakdown;
we have limited the information shown in Table 2 to the 200 cases
where the breakdown was complete and the sum of the various
categories of damages equaled the amount shown for the total
verdict. The table shows both the breakdown for all of the cases in 
133. We used the base 10 logarithm rather than the natural logarithm because it simplifies
the scaling of the graphs that we present; neither the graphs nor the regressions would
change appreciably if we were to use the natural logarithm.
134. See Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages, supra note 132, at 18.
135. What we show as Table 1 was produced by Eisenberg and his colleagues in response
to the Supreme Court’s use of one of their earlier reports in its decision concerning punitive
damages, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). Eisenberg and his colleagues’
earlier article reported the mean, median, and standard deviation of the punitive to
compensatory damages ratio in jury trials as 2.90, 0.62, and 13.81, respectively. Eisenberg et
al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages, supra note 132, at 269. The Supreme Court found
the standard deviation troublesome. See 554 U.S. at 499-500. In response to the Supreme
Court’s use of their analysis, Eisenberg and his colleagues published the article containing
our Table 1 to show that the high standard deviation was largely an artifact of cases resulting
in small compensatory awards. See Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages, supra
note 132, at 18. One minor difference between the original table and what we show is that we
list the lowest category of compensatory awards as starting at $1 rather than $0. When asked
if the labeling in the article was incorrect, Eisenberg responded, “You must be right. We
probably excluded zero compensatory cases.” E-mail from Theodore Eisenberg, Professor of
Law, Cornell Univ. Law Sch., to Herbert Kritzer (Nov. 20, 2010) (on file with first author).
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Table 1: Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages as Reported
by Eisenberg et al.
Source: Theodore Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages:  An Empirical Assessment
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL
& THEORETICAL ECON. 5, 18 (2010).
the sample and for the three separate categories of auto accidents,
medical and dental malpractice (henceforth “medical malpractice”),
and premises liability cases.
The table shows six types of expenses that fall under economic
damages, including dental expenses, education expenses, funeral
expenses, medical expenses, lost income/time/wages, and miscella-
neous. It also shows eight types of expenses that fall under
noneconomic damages, including disability, disfigurement, emo-
tional distress, loss of consortium, lost normal life, loss of society,
pain and suffering, and miscellaneous. Overall, economic damages
made up 43% of overall awards, and noneconomic damages consti-
tuted 57% of total awards. However, the proportion of economic and
noneconomic damages differed across type of cases. For auto cases,
the awards were split evenly between economic and noneconomic
damages. In comparison, the ratios of economic to noneconomic
damages were 1:3 for medical cases and 2:3 for premises liability
cases.
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As one would expect, medical expenses seem to dominate
economic damages in that the majority of cases reported medical
expenses. About 96% of auto cases (124 out of 129), 72% of medical
malpractice cases (39 out of 54), and 82% of premises liability cases
(14 out of 17) listed medical expenses. In terms of dollar values,
medical expenses accounted for 44% of total damage awards for auto
cases, 21% for medical malpractice cases, and 26% for premises
liability cases. The second most frequent type of economic damages
was lost income, both past and future: 33% of auto cases, 22% of
medical malpractice cases, and 53% of premises liability cases
reported lost income. In terms of dollar values, lost income tended
to be a small part of the overall award, making up on average 5% of
total damage awards for auto cases, 2% for medical malpractice
cases, and 12% for premises liability cases. The remaining four
types of economic damages were minimal for all cases.
Pain and suffering dominated noneconomic damages, and the
majority of cases reported such damages. About 85% of auto cases
(110 out of 129), 75% of medical malpractice cases (42 out of 54), and
88% of premises liability cases (15 out of 17) listed pain and
suffering damages. In terms of dollar values, pain and suffering
accounted for 32% of total damage awards for auto cases, 31% for
medical malpractice cases, and 38% for premises liability cases. The
other category of noneconomic damages that was fairly common was
loss of normal life: 46% of auto cases, 50% of medical malpractice
cases, and 53% of premises liability cases include awards for loss of
normal life as noneconomic damages. In terms of dollar values, lost
normal life accounted for 11% of total damage awards for auto cases,
14% for medical malpractice cases, and 13% for premises liability
cases. In addition, a substantial number of cases listed disfigure-
ment and disability, and the pattern was consistent across types of
cases. Loss of society seems to only have mattered for medical
malpractice. For example, 24% of those cases listed loss of society as
noneconomic damages, and the award amount of loss of society
made up 15% of total damage awards. In comparison, loss of society
was minimal for both auto and premises liability cases.
Turning now to the relationship between economic and
noneconomic damages in the Cook County dataset, we looked at all
cases together and then split the cases into auto accidents, medical 
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Figure 1: Cook County, Illinois, 2005 & 2010
malpractice, and premises liability. Figure 1 shows the plots for the
206 cases for which we had information on both economic and
noneconomic damages,  and both were nonzero; the figure shows136
the plot for all cases and for the three separate categories. Each plot
shows two lines. The broken line is a least squares linear regression
line. We fitted the solid line using Stata’s locally weighted scatter-
plot smoothing procedure (LOWESS, also known as LOESS).
Essentially, LOWESS fits a series of short lines using overlapping
subsets of the data, which can illustrate nonlinearities without
requiring the specification of a particular functional form. If the
LOWESS and linear regression lines are very close, it is a good
indicator that the relationship is linear. Figure 1 shows a strong
linear relationship for all of the cases taken together and for auto
136. For 18 cases we were unable to distinguish between economic and noneconomic
damages. For 21 cases economic damages appear to be zero, and for 17 cases noneconomic
damages appear to be zero; those cases were omitted because the logarithm of zero is
undefined.
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Table 3: Regression Results for Cook County Data
cases. The fits for the medical malpractice and premises liability
cases appear to deviate from linearity, with the medical malpractice
cases not following a clear pattern. This may reflect the relatively
small number of cases, particularly the small number of premises
liability cases (sixteen). Table 3 summarizes the regressions
represented by the broken lines in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, the
regression fit for medical malpractice was very weak; the fit for
premises liability was better, but not as good as for the auto
accident cases.
Because we have an indicator of the severity of the injury in the
form of the NAIC codes for the Illinois data, we can assess whether
using the additional information helps to predict the noneconomic
damage award. We also have the gender of the plaintiff and, for
most of the observations, the plaintiff ’s age. Preliminary analysis
showed that there were no statistically significant differences
between auto accident and premises liability cases, and hence we
collapsed those two categories for purposes of the extended analysis.
Table 4 shows a set of four models that employ various combina-
tions of variables. Model 1 in Table 4 includes the predictors
including the logarithm of the economic damages, the injury
severity measure, the interaction of economic damages and injury
severity (that is, an indicator of whether the influence of one of
these variables depends on the other), a dummy variable for medical
malpractice cases, a dummy variable for gender, the plaintiff ’s age,
and the square of the plaintiff ’s age.  The fit of the model is quite137
good; it accounts for 69% of the variation in the logarithm of
noneconomic damages, a substantial increase over the 53% ex-
137. Including the square of the plaintiff ’s age allows the relationship between age and
noneconomic damages to be nonlinear. In Table 4 the effect of the square of age has been
multiplied by 1000 in order to show nonzero digits.
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plained by economic damages alone.  All of the predictors were138
statistically significant except for age and gender.
The negative interaction term indicates that as economic
damages increased, the impact of severity decreased (or alterna-
tively, as severity increased, the impact of economic damages de-
creased). The coefficient for medical malpractice indicates that, with
other factors held constant, noneconomic damage awards were
higher in medical malpractice cases. However, as indicated in Model
2, which adds an interaction between medical malpractice and
economic damages, noneconomic damages increased with economic
damages less slowly in medical malpractice cases; in fact, combining
the economic damages coefficient and the interaction with medical
malpractice for Model 2, the effect of economic damages in medical
malpractice cases was about half of what it was in auto and
premises liability cases. In this model, the interaction between
injury severity and economic damages is no longer statistically
significant, and the two demographic variables remain nonsignifi-
cant.
Models 3 and 4 modify how severity is handled by treating death
cases differently. In these models, a modified injury severity index
codes death as zero with a separate dummy variable to indicate
death; in addition, the model includes an interaction term between
the death dummy variable and economic damages. With these
changes, the modified injury severity index in Model 3 does not
achieve statistical significance while the death indicator is strongly
significant; neither of the interaction terms involving the injury and
economic damages is statistically significant, nor are the demo-
graphic variables.
Model 4 drops gender and age, which had shown no evidence of
having an influence on noneconomic damages; this adds a small 
number of additional cases to the analysis. This model explains 73%
of the variation in noneconomic damages, and all predictors except
for the interaction between economic damages and the modified
injury severity index achieve statistical significance at the .05 (one-
tailed) level or better.
138. These percentages are simply the r  or R  multiplied by 100; for the simple regression,2 2
the r  is from Table 3.2
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Table 4: Multiple Regression Results for Cook County Verdicts
Standard errors of coefficients shown in parentheses. Bold indicates coefficients that are
statistically significant at the .05 (one-tailed) level or better.
Table 5 shows the ratio of noneconomic to economic damages
broken down by level of economic damages and type of case. Unlike
in Table 1, which showed a similar type of breakdown for the ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages, we do not observe a
consistently declining ratio as the amount of economic damages
increased. As Table 5 shows, this was true for auto accident cases
but not for medical malpractice cases and premises liability cases,
both of which did show a declining ratio. Exactly why this was not
true for auto cases is not clear, but we speculate that it has
something to do with the auto accident cases that actually get to
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trial in Cook County. Specifically, it may be that the larger auto
cases that were tried involved particular issues with regard to
noneconomic damages, while the smaller cases may have involved
issues related to liability or preexisting conditions. As we will show
in later sections of this Article, we saw somewhat similar patterns
with regard to auto accidents in some of the other datasets we
examined.
B. Bureau of Justice Statistics Data
For the BJS dataset, we again looked at all cases together and
then split the cases into three categories: auto accidents, medical
malpractice, and other personal injury. Figure 2 shows the plots for
all cases and for the three separate categories. Figure 2 shows
strong linear relationships for all of the cases taken together and for
both auto and other personal injuries; however, the fit for the
medical malpractice cases is less clear.
Table 6 summarizes the regression results for the broken lines
shown in Figure 2.  Note the last column in the table, which139
displays the percentage of plaintiff ’s verdicts for which nonzero
values were reported for both economic and noneconomic damages,
and hence, are included in the analysis. Both auto accident cases
and the other personal injury cases produced good fits with positive
regression coefficients, indicating that noneconomic damages
increased in a linear fashion as economic damages increased. The
exception is the small subset of medical malpractice cases, which
also demonstrated a low r  in the Cook County data discussed above.2
One difference is that these data include states that have imposed
caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases,  and140
it may be that the weak relationship in such cases reflects in part
the presence of caps in some states. Hence, the table also shows
separate regressions for those cases in which a cap did and did not 
139. We note that Eisenberg and Heise’s analyses show a strong relationship between
compensatory and punitive damages. For the 2005 BJS dataset used here, they report an r2
of .589 and a slope coefficient of .857, virtually identical to what we show for all cases in Table
2 above. See Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 132, at 335-36.
140. See AM. MED. ASS ’N , CAPS ON DAMAGES (2011), available at http://www.ama-assn.
org/resources/doc/arc/caps-on-damages-jan-2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (relating
information on damage caps in medical malpractice cases).
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Table 5: Ratio of Noneconomic to Economic Compensatory
Damages from Cook County Dataset
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Figure 2: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005 Data
apply; the number of cases is quite small, but it is clear that there
is little difference between the two subsets of cases.141
Table 7 reports the statistics concerning the noneconomic to
economic damage ratios for all of the cases and for the three subsets
of cases broken down by the amount of economic damages. Here, we
use the same categories used by Eisenberg and his coauthors in
their analysis of the punitive to compensatory damage ratios in the
BJS dataset.  The best summary figures to look at are the medians142
because a small number of extreme values can substantially inflate
the means. Overall, there was a fairly consistent pattern in the
median ratios of the noneconomic to economic damages: the
medians declined as the amount of economic damages increased. 
141. We found no evidence of a difference between the two subsets of cases when we
included an interaction term in the model with all medical malpractice cases; the presence or
absence of a cap had no impact on the relationship between economic and noneconomic
damages.
142. Eisenberg et al., Variability in Punitive Damages, supra note 132, at 18.
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Table 6: Regression Results for BJS Data
The one exception is the highest economic damage category for auto
accident cases; however, it should be noted that there are only eight
observations in this category.
Looking at the cases overall, the median was just over 1 (1.19),
indicating that in the median case the amount of noneconomic
damages was about 20% more than the economic damages. This is
consistent with the overall regression shown in Table 6, which
showed the overall regression coefficient as close to 1 (.904). One
noteworthy difference between what Table 7 shows and what the
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages in Table 1 shows
is that the standard deviation in the noneconomic to economic
damage ratio tended to stay high—up to $100,000 in compensatory
damages—while the standard deviation in the punitive to compen-
satory ratio dropped when the compensatory damages reached
$10,000. However, this result is likely generated by a very small
number of cases. We say this because an alternate measure of
variation, the Interquartile Range (IQR) which is the difference
between the first and third quartiles (both of which are shown in
Table 3), does drop sharply by the time economic damages reach
$10,000 when we look at all cases together or at auto accident cases;
the IQR does not drop until economic damages reach $100,000 for
medical malpractice and other personal injury cases.
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Figure 3: RAND Jury Study, All Cases 1995-1999
C. RAND Jury Verdict Study Data
The number of cases and the coding detail for the RAND data
allowed us to split those data into five categories: auto (including 
common carrier), premises liability, medical malpractice, product
liability,  and other personal injuries. Figure 3 shows the relation-143
ship between noneconomic and economic damages (both logged); in
this figure we omit the points because they obscure the lines. As
with the previous figures, the solid line is fit using the LOWESS
procedure and the broken line is the simple regression line. A clear
pattern of linear increase appears for all of the case subsets,
although the LOWESS lines suggest some deviations for premises 
143. In the BJS dataset, there was a specific code for asbestos-related cases, which we
excluded from our analysis; we are not able to exclude asbestos cases from the RAND dataset,
which means that some of the product liability cases may be asbestos-related cases.
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Table 7: Ratio of Noneconomic Compensatory Damages
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Datasets
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Table 8: Regression Results for RAND Data
liability cases and products liability cases. Table 8 shows the
regression results for the various subsets. The strongest relation-
ship, both in terms of the r  and the slope, is for auto accident cases,2
although it is also the type of case for which the proportion of cases
with information on both economic and noneconomic damages was
the lowest.
Interestingly, both the r  and the slope for auto cases in the2
RAND data are very similar to what we reported above for the Cook
County and the BJS datasets. As with the prior two datasets, the r s2
and slopes drop off for the other types of cases. We also grouped the
cases other than auto and medical malpractice, and reran the
regression to provide a comparison to the “Other Personal Injury”
category in the BJS data. The slope and r s were .570 and .4039,2
respectively, which are only slightly lower than the comparable
figures from our analysis of the BJS data.
One question about the results for the medical malpractice cases
is what difference California’s limits on noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases make.  Table 8 shows separate results144
for the California medical malpractice cases and medical malprac-
tice from other states; clearly, the relationship between economic 
144. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1975), available at  http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.
html/civ_table_of_contents.html (part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA)). See PACE ET AL., supra note 130, for an analysis of the California medical
malpractice cases in the RAND data.
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Table 9: Ratio of Noneconomic to Economic
 Compensatory Damages from RAND Dataset
(other than Medical Malpractice Cases)
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Figure 4: RAND Medical Malpractice Cases
and noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases was weaker
in California than in the other states in the study.145
Table 9 shows the noneconomic to economic damage ratios for all
case types except for medical malpractice, which appear in Table 10.
Table 9 shows that the median and mean ratios tended to decline
sharply as the amount of economic damages increased; similarly,
the amount of variation in the ratios, as measured either by the
standard deviation or the interquartile range, tended to decrease.
This was also true in medical malpractice cases, as Table 10 shows.
Table 10 also provides further evidence on the impact of the cap
on noneconomic damages in California.  California’s ratios were 146
145. Fitting a regression model for medical malpractice cases that includes an interaction
term shows that the difference is statistically significant (t=2.74, two-tailed p=.006).
146. In Table 6 we omit from the lower two panels the small number of cases in which
economic damages were between $1 and $999 (one case for California and four cases for the
other states); these cases are included in the statistics in the rows labeled “All.”
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Table 10: Ratio of Noneconomic to Economic Compensatory
Damages from RAND Dataset (Medical Malpractice Cases)
similar to those of other states in the RAND data until economic
damages reach the $100,000 to $999,999 category, at which point
they dropped sharply compared to the other states. Another way to 
see the drop-off in noneconomic damage payments in California is
shown in Figure 4, which plots the logarithms of economic and
noneconomic damages in California as filled circles and the other
states as open squares. The fitted line shown is across all medical
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malpractice cases. We added a vertical line to divide the figure
between cases with less than $100,000 in economic damages and
cases with economic damages of $100,000 or more. There is little or
no difference in the scatter between California and the other states
when the economic damages were less than $100,000. After
$100,000, a small proportion of the California cases fall above the
line, while for the other states there is a fairly even scatter above
and below the line. The figure also has a horizontal line at the
$250,000 cap on noneconomic damages; we presume that for these
California cases, jury awards would have been reduced to no more
than $250,000 by the judge.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We modeled most of our analyses above on Eisenberg’s and his
colleagues’ work regarding the relationship between punitive and
compensatory damages.  Using three primary data sources plus147
three supplemental sources discussed in the Appendix, we looked at
how well noneconomic damages could be predicted by economic
damages and at how the ratio of noneconomic damages to economic
damages changed as the magnitude of the economic damages
awarded by juries increased.  One important caveat regarding our148
analysis is that we have, with some exceptions, focused our analysis
on cases in which the jury awarded explicit, nonzero amounts for
both economic and noneconomic damages.
Using the Cook County data, our study is the first to provide
detailed breakdowns of damage awards both for economic damages
and noneconomic damages. Although medical expenses and lost
income make up a large proportion of economic damages, pain and
suffering is the most important type of noneconomic damages.
However, readers should note that noneconomic damages also take
the form of disability, disfigurement, emotional distress, loss of
consortium, loss of normal life, and loss of society.
In our analysis, we found a mixture of consistent and inconsis-
tent patterns across our various datasets. One fairly consistent
147. See supra note 133 and acompanying text.
148. Unlike Eisenberg and his colleagues, we have not attempted to compare jury-set
noneconomic damages to those set by judges.
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pattern was the tendency for the ratio of noneconomic to economic
damages to decline as the amount of economic damages increased.
Moreover, the variability of the ratio also tended to decline as the
amount of economic damages increased. We found less consistency
in our simple regression models where we predicted the logarithm
of noneconomic damages from the logarithm of economic damages.
In all of those models the slopes of the fitted line were positive, but
the slopes and the measures of fit (r ) varied from one dataset to2
another and among types of cases within those datasets with
multiple case types. Also, when we had the same type of case across
datasets, we found variation in the fit and slope. The latter was
most striking for medical malpractice cases where we found a very
weak relationship within the Bureau of Justice Statistics and
National Center for State Courts 2005 verdict study, and that weak
relationship held up even when we added controls for whether a
state had a cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases.
With two of the datasets we were able to extend our regression
models with regard to medical malpractice cases. Using the RAND
jury study from 1995-1999, we were able to separate out California’s
medical malpractice cases, which were governed by the MICRA cap
on noneconomic damages, from the cases coming from five other
states included in the study. We found that MICRA dampened the
relationship between economic and noneconomic damages. However,
we have no way of knowing whether that result was due to differ-
ences in the cases lawyers brought to trial or differences in how
lawyers chose to present cases. Research shows that caps can
influence which cases lawyers choose to pursue,  and other149
research indicates that, in the face of caps, lawyers may seek to
persuade the jury to award more damages in an uncapped category
as a way of shifting damages from the capped category to types of
damages that are not capped.150
149. See generally Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “It is No Longer Viable from a
Practical and Business Standpoint”: Damage Caps, “Hidden Victims,” and the Declining
Interest in Medical Malpractice Cases, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 59 (2010) (discussing impact
of damage caps on plaintiffs’ malpractice attorneys in Texas); Stephen Daniels & Joanne
Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between Damage Caps and Access to the
Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2006) (same).
150. For a discussion of this issue vis-à-vis caps on punitive damages, see Tom Baker,
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Using the data we coded from Cook County, Illinois jury
verdicts, we were able to expand our regression models to include
the NAIC severity index plus the gender and age of the plaintiff.151
We found no evidence that the two demographic variables systemat-
ically influenced the amount of noneconomic damages, but the
severity of injury did make a difference. Most importantly, we found
that the severity of the injury conditioned the relationship between
economic and noneconomic damages. For example, we found a much
weaker relationship between economic and noneconomic damages
in cases that resulted in death than we found in cases producing
major permanent disability. This pattern makes sense because in
some of the death cases the victim would have died during or
immediately after the malpractice occurred, or the nature of the
malpractice may have been such that there was no significant pain
and suffering before death occurred. The senior author observed a
mediation in a malpractice case in which the defendant had failed
to diagnose a major heart condition and the victim died of a heart
attack. The plaintiff had suffered significant economic damages,
namely loss of financial support, but the only noneconomic damages
would have been loss of consortium or loss of enjoyment of life.
Comparing our results to what Eisenberg and his colleagues
have reported for the relationship between punitive and compensa-
tory damages, it is clear that there tends to be considerably more
variability in the relationship between noneconomic and economic
damages than between punitive and compensatory damages. Some
observers might argue that this shows that changes are called for to
reduce that variability; some have suggested creating a schedule or
guidelines for such damages,  as has been done in England and152
Wales.  Several years ago, the first author suffered a broken ankle153
while visiting London and sought compensation from the construc-
tion company that had left an excavation on a sidewalk inade-
quately safeguarded. The settlement for the injury covered his
economic loss plus an amount for general damages that was right in
Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS.
L. REV. 211.
151. We provide a similar analysis, reported in the Appendix, using the Missouri medical
malpractice insurance data.
152. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 13, at 939 n.153, 940.
153. See generally JUDICIAL STUDIES BD., supra note 55.
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line with the range of compensation recommended in the guidelines
in effect at the time.
The first author’s London experience also points to the potential
problems of scheduling general damages. Although the broken ankle
was a significant inconvenience with regard to a number of daily
activities (bathing, driving, and generally getting around), and
although he experienced pain in the minutes after the
injury—before the ambulance arrived and medication was
administered—he felt virtually no pain after the surgery (much to
his surprise). He did experience some pain and discomfort during
the rehabilitation process, particularly after long walks, but nothing
more than he often experienced after straining his back. In contrast,
other people often experience substantial pain after similar injuries.
To the extent that the goal of general damages is to compensate for
what is actually experienced, the amount the first author received
should be at the lower end of compensation for pain and suffering
for such an injury.
More generally, although the comparison of the variability in the
relationship between noneconomic damages and economic damages
to the variability in the relationship between punitive damages and
compensatory damages is useful as a means of putting our results
in perspective, the comparison cannot serve as evidence regarding
the need to limit noneconomic damages. The argument regarding
punitive damages relies heavily on the principle that punishment
needs to be driven by standards, and that deterrence is driven by
expectation.  In contrast, if the goal of compensatory damages,154
including compensatory damages for noneconomic loss, is compensa-
tion, the damages need to be geared to the actual loss. Although the
degree of loss is usually related to the severity of an injury, there
will be substantial variation depending on personal circumstances.
Clearly, the magnitude of any loss of income depends both on the
nature of the injury and the victim’s level of income; no one has
argued that compensation for lost income should be tied to a
schedule that is in turn tied to the nature of the injury. Measuring
noneconomic loss is more difficult than measuring lost income,
154. See Jacqueline Percezk, Note, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence, and Fairness:
A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
825, 852-55 (1993).
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although measuring some aspects of economic loss, such as loss of
future earning capacity, is also more difficult than measuring past
lost income. Arguably, a jury representing the community from
which the injured party comes, which hopefully includes at least
some people who are similarly situated to the injured party, is in a
better position to assess the degree of noneconomic loss than a
professional judge who may become inured to such loss after
hearing many cases.
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APPENDIX: INSURANCE CLAIM DATA
As mentioned above, in addition to the three primary datasets
derived directly from verdict reports, we identified three sets of data
dealing with closed insurance claims that include information on
cases going to trial. In this Appendix, we report our analyses of
those three datasets.
A. Insurance Research Council Closed Claim Data
The Insurance Research Council and its predecessor, the All-
Industry Research Advisory Council, collected data from auto claim
files closed in 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002.  The closed claim155
studies looked only at claims for which a payment was made. The
cases resulting in plaintiff ’s verdicts are less than 1% of the total
paid claims in the datasets; the five studies include 994 claims that
involved a court verdict, and 567 of these claims listed information
on both economic and noneconomic damages paid by the insurance
company. A small number of these verdicts may have been bench
trials, but we have no way of separating bench and jury trials. The
dataset includes information on the amounts that the insurance
company paid rather than specifically the amount of the verdict
awards, but given that most of the cases were relatively small, we
are assuming that most verdicts were paid without appeals or
reductions.  We have adjusted all amounts to 2002 dollars.156
155. IRC’s reports of its analyses of these studies can be found in ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH
ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1989);
INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES CLAIMING BEHAVIOR, AND ITS IMPACT ON
INSURANCE CLAIMS (1994); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, INJURIES IN AUTO ACCIDENTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF AUTO INSURANCE CLAIMS (1999); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURY
INSURANCE CLAIMS: COUNTRYWIDE PATTERNS IN TREATMENT, COST, AND COMPENSATION (2003).
Unfortunately, we did not have access to the data from IRC’s most recent study of claims
closed in 2007. See INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURY INSURANCE CLAIMS:
COUNTRYWIDE PATTERNS IN TREATMENT, COST, AND COMPENSATION (2008) [hereinafter, IRC
2008].
156. We expect that insurers are unlikely to appeal most of these cases given the amounts
involved and the costs of appeal. Insurers might threaten to appeal, but any compromise
probably deals with the “costs” that the judge might award rather than the amounts of the
verdict itself.
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Figure 5: Insurance Research Council Auto Cases
We treat the insurer’s figure for economic loss as the economic
component, and we treat the difference between the economic loss
and the amount paid as the noneconomic component of the jury
award.
Figure 5 shows the plot of noneconomic versus economic
damages, both logged. As with the other sets of auto accident data,
there is a clear relationship with an r  of .3336 and a slope of .749;2
given that the slope is less than 1, it appears that the noneconomic
damages rise more slowly than do the economic damages. As with
earlier figures, the broken line is a linear regression line and the
solid line is a LOWESS line; here the LOWESS line suggests that
there might be a slight curvilinear relationship.
Recall that for the analysis of the IRC data we have combined
claims closed in 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. Figure 6 shows the
plots separately for the four years, and Table 11 summarizes the
regressions for each subset. Figure 6 shows essentially the same 
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Figure 6: Insurance Research Council Cases by Year
pattern as does Figure 5; for all but 1997 we see the curvilinear 
pattern indicated by the solid LOWESS line. Table 11 shows similar
relationships except, perhaps, for 1987, where the relationship
appears somewhat weaker. The lower r s compared to what we2
found for auto accident cases in the other three datasets indicate
that the relationship in the IRC data is weaker in the other
datasets. We do not have an explanation for that difference,
although it may reflect that we are inferring the amount of
noneconomic damages by relying on the insurer’s figure for eco-
nomic loss.
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Table 11: Regression Results for IRC Data
Table 12 shows the summary statistics for the noneconomic
damages to economic damages ratios, both for all cases and for the
individual years. For the individual years, we have omitted the top
two categories because they were based on a very small number of
cases; the cases in those categories are included in the “All” category
for each of the years. The ratios show a clear pattern of decline as
the amount of economic damages increases. One pattern that is
evident in Table 12 is that both overall and within each economic
damages category, the ratios have tended to decline over time. This
may be an indication that juries have become less generous with
regard to noneconomic damages.  An alternate explanation might157
be that plaintiffs’ lawyers have chosen to de-emphasize noneconomic
damages and focus more on maximizing the recovery for economic
damages.
157. It is probably worth noting that if one looks at figures reported by the IRC for its
closed claim studies, a clear pattern of decline in the ratio of average payment to average
economic loss has emerged (excluding permanent total disability and fatality claimants). In
1977 the ratio was 2.29 compared to 1.49 in 2002 (and 1.19 in 2007). See IRC 2008, supra note
155, at 40 (reporting the figures from which these ratios were computed).
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Table 12: Ratio of Noneconomic to Economic
Compensatory Damages from IRC Dataset
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B. Texas Department of Insurance Data
The fifth dataset was derived from data compiled by the Texas
Department of Insurance (TDI) for closed commercial insurance
claims involving bodily injury. The TDI has data for claims involv-
ing payments of $10,000 or more for the years 1988-2009.  As of158
September 1, 2009, reporting rules changed by increasing the
payment amount that triggered the reporting requirement to
$25,000;  consequently, we limit our analysis of the TDI data to159
claims closed prior to September 1, 2009. Only cases in which the
insurer paid at least $10,000 are included, which means that cases
reversed on appeal or in which the verdict exceeded $10,000 but the
payment was reduced under that figure by a remittitur or by a
settlement agreement are not included in the dataset. We adjusted
all amounts to 2010 dollars.
A total of 2745 claims involved verdicts. Information on both
noneconomic and economic damages awarded was available for 2019
cases. Unlike the IRC data, the data reporting form used by TDI
specifically asks that information on the jury verdict itself be
provided. We dropped from the analysis 64 cases that were listed as
involving bench trials.  On September 1, 2003, a cap on160
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases went into effect
for cases filed on or after that date.  Only 24 claims covered by the161
cap were tried after that date, and because of the small number we
omitted them from the analysis, leaving a total of 1939 claims with
verdicts that involved jury trials and that reported nonzero amounts
for both economic and noneconomic damages.
The TDI data are based on claims, not cases, and multiple
claims can arise from a single incident involving multiple defen-
158. The level of detail required in the reporting varied with only basic information for
claims under $25,000. All of these datasets are publicly available on the TDI’s website. See
Property and Causualty Reports, TEX. DEP’T OF INS., http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/report4.
html (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
159. Detailed information is now required only for claims involving payments of at least
$75,000. See H.B. 2877, 2009 Leg., 81st Sess. (Tex. 2009).
160. For many claims, there was no indication of whether the case was tried to a jury or
to the court; we have included those cases on the assumption that a very small percentage
would have been bench trials.
161. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (West 2012).
1020 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:971
dants. Some defendants may settle or be dropped from the suit
before trial. We identified multiple claims tried in a single lawsuit
by matching year of the report, county, date suit was filed, and date
suit was tried. After dropping claims as described above and
collapsing claims that appear to have been consolidated for trial,162
we were left with 1830 cases that have nonzero amounts for both
economic and noneconomic damages.
Finally, the form used by TDI does not ask for information about
the type of case, but does ask about the type of insurance involved.
Two categories are medical professional insurance and commercial
auto insurance. The other categories include monoline general
liability, Texas commercial multiperil, and other professional
liability, all of which we collapsed into a single “other” category; it
is possible, however, that the first two of these include some auto
cases. This categorization allowed us to do analyses separately for
auto, medical, and other.
Figure 7 shows the plots for the three categories of cases in the
TDI dataset plus all cases combined; Table 13 summarizes the
results of the regression analysis. The LOWESS lines show some
evidence of nonlinearity for auto accident cases and other personal
injury. This nonlinearity appears to reflect that at the lower level of
economic damages, the noneconomic damages lie above the (broken)
linear regression line. The results in Table 13 show that there are
clear relationships for all three subsets of cases, with little variation
in the r s; however, the slope for the medical malpractice cases2
appears to be less than for the other two categories.163
162. It is possible that, if a case included multiple claims and one or more of those claims
resulted in a payment of less than $25,000, we have only partial information on the actual
verdict amount.
163. To test whether these differences are statistically significant, we added interaction
terms to the simple regression model. The joint test of the two interaction terms is
statistically significant (F=5.86, df=2.1824, p=.003). The individual test of the interaction term
representing the difference in the slope between medical malpractice cases and the “other”
category of cases was significant using a one-tailed test (t=1.84, p=.033); the individual test
involving the term for auto accident cases was strongly significant (t=3.40, p=.001).
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Figure 7: TDI Cases 1988-2009
Table 14 shows the summary statistics for the noneconomic
damages to economic damages ratio for the TDI data, both overall
and separately by case type. As with the IRC data, one sees a clear
pattern of decline as economic damages increase. One noteworthy
variation in this pattern is that the speed of the decline is less for
medical malpractice cases than for the other two groups of cases.
Recall the pattern of decline over time that was evident in the
IRC data. Given that the TDI data we are using span twenty-two
years, those data provide the opportunity to examine whether that
temporal pattern was unique to auto cases or more general.  Table164
15 shows the median ratio of noneconomic to economic damages for
five periods (1988-1992, 1993-1996, 1997-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-
2009); the periods are represented in the columns of the table.
Because of the very small number of cases in the lowest category of 
164. Actually, some trials in the dataset took place as early as 1982 because the annual
collections of data are based on the date the claim was closed. For purposes of Table 14, we
have dropped trials that occurred prior to 1988 (a total of 63 cases).
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Table 13: Regression Results for TDI Data
economic damages (under $1000), that category is omitted from
Table 15. It is difficult to discern a temporal pattern in Table 15.
C. Missouri Insurance Department Medical Malpractice Data
The final data source exclusively involved medical malpractice
claims. We obtained these data from the Missouri Department of
Insurance. In Missouri, medical malpractice insurers, including self-
insured entities, are required to report all claims to the Department
of Insurance. The period covered by the data we obtained is from
1990 through the beginning of 2012; the data include a total of
42,022 claims involving 24,072 incidents. From these claims, we
extracted 402 claims that resulted in plaintiff ’s verdicts, 281 of
which included figures for both economic and noneconomic damages
that were paid by the insurers. As with the IRC data, the Missouri
medical malpractice data report payments, not actual verdicts, and
we are again making the assumption that the payments generally
are the same as the verdict awards. With medical malpractice cases,
however, there is a greater chance that a remittitur or a post-verdict
settlement reduced the damages that the insurer actually paid from
the amount of the verdict. Consequently, the results from these data
must be viewed with caution. For purposes of analysis we collapsed
multiple tried claims from the same incident, leaving 236 cases.165
All amounts were adjusted to 2010 dollars.
165. Unlike the Texas insurance data, the Missouri data included a specific indicator that
linked multiple claims from the same incident. We have assumed that all claims from an
incident that went to trial were tried together.
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Table 14: Ratio of Noneconomic to Economic
Compensatory Damages from TDI Dataset
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Table 15: Median Ratio of Noneconomic to Economic
Compensatory Damages from TDI Dataset by Period
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Figure 8: Missouri Medical Malpractice Cases
Figure 8 shows the relationship between noneconomic and
economic damages for this dataset. The fit, which is shown both on
the figure and as Model 1 in Table 16, is comparable to what we
found for medical malpractice cases in other datasets. The Missouri
data that we obtained from the Missouri Department of Insurance
include the NAIC injury scale. Adding severity to the regression
model improves that fit slightly (see Model 2 shown in Table 16),
and a further improvement can be achieved by taking death out of
the severity index and treating it as a dummy variable (as we did
with the Cook County data); that is, using an equation that has a
logarithm of economic damages, injury severity from one to eight
(with death claims set as zero on the severity scale), and a dummy
variable coded one for death and zero for nondeath claims. This
equation produces an R  of .3324 (Model 3 in Table 16).2
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Table 16: Regression Models for Missouri Malpractice Data
Standard errors of coefficients shown in parentheses. Bold indicates coefficients that are
statistically significant at the .01 level or better.
Models 1 to 3 in Table 16 all assume the relationships between
the predictors and the logarithm of noneconomic damages are
additive. Models 4 and 5 add interaction terms that allow the effect
of economic damages to vary depending on the severity of the injury.
Model 4 uses the severity scale that includes both death and an
interaction term between severity and the logarithm of economic
damages; Model 5 includes the modified severity scale that does not
include death, the indicator variable for death, interaction terms
between these two variables, and the logarithm of economic
damages. As shown in Table 16, all of the predictors in both of these
models are statistically significant, with the latter model explaining
36% of the variation in noneconomic damages. All of the interaction
terms are negative, indicating that the relationship between
economic damages and noneconomic damages is dampened as injury
severity increases.
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Table 17: Ratio of Noneconomic to Economic Damages
for Missouri Medical Malpractice Cases
The final model shown in Table 16, Model 6, adds gender and
age to Model 5. As with the Cook County data, neither gender nor
age of the claimant is a statistically significant predictor of
noneconomic damages. We added gender and age to other models,
and in no case was either variable statistically significant. This was
true regardless of whether age was modeled as having a linear or a
nonlinear effect.
Table 17 reports the ratio of noneconomic to economic damages
for the Missouri cases. There is a marked pattern of decline in the
median ratio as the economic damages increase. Similarly, there is
a decline in both the mean and standard deviation. The pattern here
is consistent with what we have found with the other datasets.
